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Sexual Slavery and Customary International Law
Patricia Viseur Sellers*
Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum**

I. Introduction
The Hissène Habré trial 1 and appellate 2 judgments represent watershed legal
decisions rendering long-denied justice to victims of the brutal Chadian regime. Delayed
charges of credible sexual violence3 inflicted upon both males and females4 challenged the
judges of the Extraordinary African Court (“EAC”) in Senegal. Legal characterizations of
sexual assaults ultimately attributed to Habré represent significant jurisprudential
advancements on rape, sexual slavery and torture as international crimes.
The EAC’s observations acknowledge that sexual slavery constitutes part of the
actus reus of enslavement as crime against humanity and of slavery as a war crime.5 While
agreeing with the Chambers that sexual slavery is anchored in customary international law,
this Chapter deepens the inquiry into the international legal prohibition of sexual slavery.
The authors posit that, in fact, the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and
Slavery (“1926 Slavery Convention”) proscribed what is identified as “sexual slavery”
because sexual violence is and always has been part and parcel of both de jure (legal) and
de facto (customary) slavery.
Accordingly, the Habré Trial Chamber might have refined its distillation of sexual
slavery as customary international law by noting that it as an intractable component of
slavery, which was outlawed in the 1926 Slavery Convention. Sexual slavery, often
* Patricia Viseur Sellers is Special Advisor on Gender Crimes to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court & Visiting Fellow at Kellogg College of Oxford University.
** Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum is Associate Professor of Clinical Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law.
1
Ministère Public v. Hissène Habré, Judgment 30 May 2016, <http://www.legaltools.org/doc/98c00a/pdf/> (hereafter, Hissène Habré Trial Judgment)
2
Le Procureur v. Hissène Habré, Judgment, 27 April 2017,
<https://assets.budh.nl/tijdschriften/aj/hissein_habre_02.pdf> (hereafter, Hissène Habré Appeals
Judgment)
3
See Reed Brody, Victims Bring a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène Habré (2017),
<https://www.brotfuerdiewelt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analys
70-The_Habre_Case.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018 (recounting that victims’ and Human Rights Watch
reports told of Habré’s policy of enslavement, which included transferring women to military camps
where officers and guards detained and raped them). Additionally, the EAC found that prison guards
forced women to have sex in exchange for access to basic necessities, such as water and medicine. See,
Kim Thuy Seelinger, ‘Rape and the President: The Remarkable Trial and Partial Acquittal of Hissène
Habré,’ (2017) WPJ, <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/World-Policy-Journal2017-Seelinger-16-22-2.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018 (hereafter Thuy Seelinger, ‘Rape and the President’)
4
Hissène Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) paras 610–20
5
The authors posit that, more precisely, sexual violence—as opposed to “sexual slavery”—is part of the
actus reus or indicia of slavery and enslavement.
1

mischaracterized as a recent or modern form of slavery, demands a more astute legal
articulation. This Chapter clarifies the law on slavery, asserting that sexual violence or
assaults on sexual integrity are integral to slavery in many—if not all—its forms. The
authors endeavor to reorient the legal discussion toward a more nuanced, multidimensional
understanding of the crimes of slavery and enslavement.
Part II of this Chapter focuses on the EAC’s treatment of sexual violence and the
crime of sexual slavery throughout the course of the Habré trial. Part III examines the
customary law basis of slavery in all its forms as an atrocity crime, maintaining that the
1926 Slavery Convention is the proper place to begin such inquiries and to receive such
grounding. Then, Part IV asserts that “sexual slavery”—or, more precisely, sexualized
violence—comprises an actus reus or indicia of slavery whether it be de jure or de facto
slavery; thus, when present, sexual violence and sexual integrity harms cannot be
decoupled from manifestations of slavery. Part V concludes by suggesting legal and
practical rationales—including correcting course in codified international criminal law—
to reintegrate sexual violence and sexual integrity harms into our conceptualization of all
forms of slavery as an international crime.
II. Sexual Slavery in the Hissène Habré Trial
The investigating magistrates’ original referral order to the EAC in the Hissène
Habré trial recognized evidence of sexual violence, such as rapes against detained women,
sexualized torture against male prisoners and sexual violence against children.6 Despite
overwhelming proof of sexual violence, the resulting charges did not contain any explicit
allegations of sexual and gender-based crimes.7 Notwithstanding these omissions, victimwitnesses testified at trial that Habré and his soldiers detained them in secret prisons as sex
slaves, perpetrating against them additional horrific acts of violence—including rapes,
genital injuries, beatings, stabbings, forced nudity, electric shocks on sexual organs and
forced contraception (i.e., being forced to take birth control pills).8 In the wake of this
testimony, civil society groups urged the Trial Chamber to address fully the sexual
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Hissène Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) para 1480
Ibid, paras. 96–97
8
Thuy Seelinger, ‘Rape and the President’ (n 3); Testimony of Fatimé Sakine, 22 October 2015, Trust
Africa, ‘The Public Prosecution v. Hisséne Habré - Summary of the Thirty-First Hearing Held on 22
October 2015,’ <http://www.trustafrica.org/images/ICJ_reports/EAC%20Trial%20Hearing%20Report%20-%2022nd%20October%202015%20-%20English.pdf> accessed 4
April 2018; Testimony of Garba Akhaye, 28 September 2015, Trust Africa, ‘The Public Prosecution v.
Hisséne Habré - Summary of the Sixteenth Hearing Held on 28 September 2015,’
<http://www.trustafrica.org/images/ICJ_reports/EAC-%20Trial%20Hearing%20Report%20%2028th%20September%202015%20-%20English.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018; Testimony of Katouma
Deffalah, Tuesday 20 October 2015, Trust Africa, ‘The Public Prosecution v. Hisséne Habré - Summary
of the Twenty-Ninth Hearing Held on 20 October 2015,’
<http://www.trustafrica.org/images/ICJ_reports/EAC-%20Trial%20Hearing%20Report%20%2020th%20October%202015%20-%20English.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018
7
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violence, and international law experts filed an amicus curiae brief to aid the EAC in its
legal analysis of potential charges.9
Toward the close of trial, the EAC notified the parties of its duty to characterize
the entirety of the criminal conduct, inclusive of sexualized and gender-based violence.10
The victims’ representatives then submitted a motion to the EAC, requesting that the
Chambers consider sexual violence charges. 11 As a result, the EAC “re-qualified” the
evidence and amended the charges to include rape and sexual slavery as crimes against
humanity under Article 6(a) of the EAC Statute.12 Further, the EAC rightly characterized
the charges of war crimes and the autonomous crime of torture under Article 8 to comprise
sexual violence acts committed against male and female detainees.13
On May 30, 2016, the EAC convicted Habré of rape and sexual slavery as crimes
against humanity and of torture as both a war crime and a stand-alone crime. 14 The
judgment declared that Habré was liable, not only for the rapes and sexual slavery his
subordinates committed, but also for the rapes he directly perpetrated.15 To establish that
sexual slavery occurred, the Court intoned that:
. . . [T]he Chamber is satisfied that the soldiers at the camp exercised the powers
associated with property rights over them. The Chamber is also convinced that the
military men deliberately forced the females to have sex with them. There is no doubt
that [the soldiers] were conscious that the females, held captive in the camps, over a
long period of time, with no ability to escape, had no autonomy over their lives, and
that [the soldiers] exercised power over [the victims] such that, in reality, they were
under their complete control, including control over their reproductive capacity.16

Thus, the Trial Chamber found that Habré was the “maestro of the orchestra of a repressive
system”17 and culpable for the sexual violence because he was “aware that women [and
men] were held in a climate of generalized and institutionalized violence . . . in a state of
extreme vulnerability, without any protection. He also knew that they were interrogated
and monitored by male state agents, who used daily and with impunity, violence against
9

Hissène Habré: Amicus Curiae Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law,
and International Experts on Sexual Violence Under International Criminal Law,
<https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MICUS-CURIAE-BRIEF-OF-THEHUMAN-RIGHTS-CENTER-AT-THE-UNIVERSITY-OF-CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY-SCHOOL-OFLAW-AND-INTERNATIONAL-EXPERTS-ON-SEXUAL-VIOLENCE-UNDER-INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL-LAW-Eng.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018
10
Hissène Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) para 1481
11
Ibid, para 168
12
Ibid, para 179
13
Ibid, para 1565. The trial judgment explains the EAC’s ability to “re-qualify” the acts. It cites to the
French law that inspired the Senegalese law, the practice of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), and the practice before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Evidence can be requalified, as long as the accused is duly informed. Ibid, paras 160–68. The judgment holds that sexual
violence evidence can be the subject of requalification. Ibid, para 178
14
Ibid, para 536
15
Ibid, para 536
16
Ibid, para 1536 (authors’ translation)
17
Ibid, para 2155
3

the detainees.”18 In light of the evidence, the EAC concluded that Habré knew or should
have known that his subordinates would rape detainees under their complete control.19
On appeal, the EAC upheld Habré’s conviction for crimes against humanity of
sexual slavery and rape, and for the sexualized torture that his soldiers perpetrated.20 The
Appeals Chamber, however, overturned Habré’s conviction for the four rapes and acts of
torture that he physically perpetrated.21 Despite the Appellate Chamber’s finding that the
victim-witness testimony was credible, the Court ruled that the investigating judges had
not considered these sexual assaults in the ordonnance de renvoi; therefore, any change at
that stage would have consisted of modifying (read supplementing)—not recharacterizing—the facts in the ordonnance de renvoi. 22 Indeed, Khadidja Hassan
Zidane’s recounting of theses incidences came to light only after the trial began.23 Thus,
the Court procedurally could not include the sexual violence perpetrated by Habré himself
among the evidence eligible for re-qualification, and, consequently, those rapes could not
be the basis of the amended charges nor of any ensuing conviction.24
Despite the meaningful––yet partial25––redress, the re-qualification of sexual and
gender-based crimes recalibrated the narrative of Habré’s ruthless reign by situating longterm, systematic sexual violence and slavery among the regime’s most horrific crimes.
Moreover, this consideration allowed for further judicial scrutiny of sexual slavery’s
proscription under international law. The case called upon the Trial Chamber to assess the
legal status of sexual slavery at the time of the Habré regime. In other words, was sexual
slavery a crime during the 1980s under international law? The Chamber rightly responded
unequivocally in the affirmative. To reach the conclusion that the safeguards of jus cogens
and customary international law condemned sexual slavery as a crime against humanity
and a war crime at the operative time,26 the Trial Chamber meticulously reviewed the
applicable law.
The Trial Chamber noted first that customary law recognized the prohibition of
slavery around 1926 to 1930,27 and second that custom was evinced in the charters of the
international military tribunals established after World War II that enumerated individual
criminal liability for enslavement. 28 Likewise, the EAC recognized that slavery or
enslavement found berth in Control Council Law No. 10 and in the provisions of the
18

Ibid, para 2159
Ibid, para 2160 (authors’ translation). “[T]he crime of sexual slavery is charged in this case and its
prohibition was foreseeable to the Accused at the time it was committed.” Ibid, para 1498
20
Hissène Habré Appeals Judgment (n 2) para 229
21
Ibid
22
Ibid, paras 522–26, 529–31
23
Thuy Seelinger, ‘Rape and the President’ (n 3)
24
Hissène Habré Appeals Judgment (n 2) paras 527–28; Thuy Seelinger, ‘Rape and the President’ (n 3)
25
Hissène Habré Appeals Judgment (n 2) para 531
26
Hisènne Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) para 1483
27
Ibid, para 1484. Under the 1926 Slavery Convention, “slavery” is defined as “the status or condition of a
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” The
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, art. 1(1) (adopted 25 September 1926, entered into
force 9 March 1927) 60 LNTS 253 (hereafter 1926 Slavery Convention)
28
Hisènne Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) para 1485
19
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Nuremberg Principles. 29 The Chambers also acknowledged that the International Law
Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Security and Peace of Mankind dated the
inclusion of its enslavement provision to at least the 1950s. 30 The Court cited to
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as conclusive evidence
of the crime against humanity of enslavement’s customary status, 31 given that their
exercise of jurisdiction was limited to crimes under customary law.
To determine the international customary law basis of sexual slavery, the Trial
Chamber appraised the international criminal jurisprudence. First, the Court examined
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., an ICTY case in which the Tribunal convicted several
accused for enslavement as a crime against humanity based upon the defendants’ sexual
control of detained Bosnian Muslim females during the war in the former Yugoslavia.32
The Habré Trial Chamber cited to the Kunarac judgment’s reasoning that enslavement
could comprise acts of a sexual nature33 and that such sexual control could be the means
by which to carry out enslavement.34 The Trial Chamber further noted that the ECCC
confirmed in its arrest warrant in Prosecutor v. Duch that the exercise of sexual control
could be considered part of the customary law of enslavement.35 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that international customary law recognized sexual slavery as a factual indicator
of the crime of enslavement.
Turning its gaze on international humanitarian law, the Habré Trial Chamber
scrutinized national military cases emanating from World War II and found that sexual
slavery was perpetrated in many venues, including detention camps.36 The Chamber noted
the Batavia Temporary Military Court’s case of Colonel Shoichi Ikeda for crimes
committed in Dutch colonized Indonesia.37 The Military Court convicted Ikeda for the
abduction and forced prostitution of thirty-five Dutch female detainees who Ikeda coerced
into sexual service of Japanese soldiers in a brothel.38 The Trial Chamber also relied on
analysis from the Appendix to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery, observing that, by the 1940s, international customary law proscribed
the wartime sexual slavery endured by the so-called “comfort women” of World War II.39
Moreover, the EAC noted Geneva Convention provisions––in particular Common Article
3 and Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention––that prohibit rape and sexual slavery

29

Ibid, para 1486
Ibid, para 1487
31
Ibid, paras 1487–88
32
Ibid, para 1490
33
Ibid
34
Ibid, para 1491
35
Ibid. See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, (Judgment) [2010] Case File No. 001/18-072007/ECCC/TC paras 147–54 (hereafter Duch)
36
Hisènne Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) para 1493
37
Ibid, para 1493
38
Ibid
39
Ibid
30
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as jus cogens norms. 40 The Chambers cited international jurisprudence, such as the
Guatemalan Sepur Zarco case and the ICTY’s Furundžija case to support these findings.41
The Trial Chamber cogently ascribed the wartime prohibition of sexual violence under
customary international humanitarian law as descending from the Lieber Code, the 1907
Fourth Hague Convention, and Control Council Law No. 10. 42 Given the bevy of
customary norms, international jurisprudence, treaty law, commentary and scholarly
writings, the Trial Chamber concluded that, under international humanitarian law, sexual
slavery, indeed, is a form of slavery.43
The Habré judgment’s customary law grounding of sexual slavery as both a crime
against humanity and a war crime is commendable. Most significant is the Trial Chamber’s
pronouncement that “sexual slavery . . . is an element to take into account to determine
whether there was enslavement and the duration during which the powers of ownership
have been exercised.” 44 This Chapter, however, interrogates whether customary
international law proscribed sexual slavery as a determinant of ownership earlier, under
the 1926 Slavery Convention. If so, the crime that is now codified as “sexual slavery,”
begs reconsideration. The authors proffer that physical and psychological sexual violence
acts were (and are) interconnected and inseparable from chattel and other forms of slavery.
Thus, mischaracterizing sexual slavery as a recent or modern form of slavery ignores the
historical realities of enslavement and misconstrues the legal abolition of slavery in all its
forms.
III. Slavery in All Its Forms under the 1926 Slavery Convention
Consistent with the Habré Trial Chamber’s analysis, the authors recognize that the
prohibition against slavery, enslavement, and the slave trade is a non-derogable, 45 jus
40

Ibid, paras 1494–95; see also Prosecutor v Ntganda, (Second Decision on the Defense’s Challenge to
the Jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9) [2017] ICC-01/04-02/06, para 51
41
Hisènne Habré Trial Judgment (n 1) paras 1494–95
42
Ibid, para 1496
43
Ibid, para 1497
44
Ibid, para 1504. The authors agree with the Habré Trial Chamber’s observation and, as demonstrated
below, offer that the more precise legal determination is that sexualized violence is an act that is
evidence, or indicia, of slavery, which is present whenever the perpetrator exercises powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person. For a detailed analysis, see Section IV, infra
45
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, G.A. Res 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948) (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all
their forms.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 16 December
1966) 999 UNTS 171 (Art. 8(1): “No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and slave-trade in all their
forms shall be prohibited.” Art. 8(2): “No one shall be held in servitude.” Art. 8(3)(a): “No one shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour.”); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3
September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (Art. 4(1): “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.” Art. 4(2):
“No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.”); American Convention on Human
Rights (opened for signature 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1,
Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Art. 6(1): “No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which
are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women.” Art. 6(2): “No one shall be
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cogens norm46 with attendant erga omnes obligations.47 Under international law, slavery
was prohibited in times of war and peace; by 1945, twenty-six international instruments
codified the prohibition of slavery and slavery-like practices. 48 Bassiouni posited the
customary law basis of slavery crimes and similar practices, noting that:
The cumulative effect of these [numerous international law] instruments established that
slavery, slave-related practices and forced labor, were before 1945, prohibited under
conventional international law, and . . . also establish the customary international law
basis for the prohibition of these practices and for their inclusion as part of “crimes
against humanity.”49

The first international attempt at codifying the universal prohibition of slavery and
the slave trade, the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (1926
Slavery Convention), however, defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”50 The
1926 Slavery Convention includes either “status” or “condition” in the definition and
actually enlarged the prohibition to govern de jure slavery (evidenced by legal title) and
de facto slavery (evidenced by customary practice).51
To grasp the breadth of slavery’s operative definition, the 1926 Slavery
required to perform forced or compulsory labor.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(opened for signature 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (Art. 5: “Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity
inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and
degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and
treatment shall be prohibited.”)
46
See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press 1971);
Alfred Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’ [1966] AJIL 58–59; see also
Gay J. McDougall, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like
Practices during Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998, para 46 (hereafter
McDougall Report)
47
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep
3, para 33–34. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated:
In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression,
and of genocide, [and] also from the principles and rules the basic human rights of the
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law
. . . . [O]thers are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character.

Ibid (authors’ emphasis); see also McDougall Report (n 46) para 74; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International
Crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes’ [1998] L & Contemp. Prob. 63–74
48
M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Enslavement as an International Crime’ [1991] NYU JILP 445; McDougall Report
(n 46) para 46; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary
Application (Cambridge University Press 2011) 378 (hereafter Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity)
49
Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity (n 48) 378; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in
International Criminal Law 299 (Springer Netherlands 1992)
50
1926 Slavery Convention, (n 27) art 1(1)
51
Fazenda Verde: Amicus Curiae Helen Duffy, <http://rightsinpractice.org/Brazil-Verde-SlaveryAmicus.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018
7

Convention’s preparatory works, 52 as well as Viscount Cecil’s Temporary Slavery
Commission Report53 are informative. Cecil’s Report accompanying the proposed 1926
Slavery Convention demonstrates that slavery’s operative definition is the exercise of
“powers attaching to the right of ownership.”54 Thus, the factual and legal understanding
of the 1926 Slavery Convention encompasses the exercise of powers of ownership based
upon sexual access to an enslaved person—what is today referred to as “sexual slavery.”
As the Habré Trial Chamber observed, sexual slavery is a factor in determining the
occurrence of enslavement. 55 In other words, sexual slavery is slavery when powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. Consequently, sexual slavery is not a
distinct form of slavery; rather, any and all forms of slavery (de jure and de facto) can be—
and often are—inclusive of sexual slavery whenever sexualized violence is integral to the
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.
The objective of the League of Nations—which included several Colonial powers
who engaged in slavery and other widespread exploitative labor practices—was narrowly
tailored toward ending legal (i.e. de jure, or chattel) slavery and the slave trade. 56
Notwithstanding this narrow aim, independent expert-members of the Temporary Slavery
Commission recommended a broad definition of slavery that encompassed nearly all
contemplated forms of human exploitation.57 In 1925, the Temporary Slavery Commission
set forth that “debt slavery,” the enslaving of persons disguised as the adoption of children,
and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, etc. constituted
slavery whenever the definitional element of slavery––exercising any or all of the powers
of ownership––were met.58
52

See Jean Allain, The Slavery Conventions, The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926 League of Nations
Convention and the 1956 United Nations Convention (2008) (hereafter Allain, Travaux Préparatoires);
Jean Allain, ‘A Legal Consideration Slavery in Light of the Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926
Convention’ [2006] paper presented at the Twenty-First Century Slavery: Issues and Responses
Conference, The Wilberforce Institute for the Study of Slavery and Emancipation (WISE) (hereafter
Allain, ‘Legal Consideration of Slavery’)
53
League of Nations, Slavery Convention: Report presented to the Assembly by the Sixth Committee
[1926] A.104.1926.VI (hereafter Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report)
54
Ibid; see Allain, ‘Legal Consideration of Slavery,’ p 11 (n 52)
55
Hisènne Habré, Trial Judgment, para 1504 (n 1)
56
Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report (n 53)
57
Jean Allain, The Law and Slavery (Brill 2015) 423–24 (hereafter Allain, The Law and Slavery)
58
League of Nations, Annex: Draft Convention, League of Nations Official Journal (Special Supplement
33) Records of the Sixth Assembly: Text of Debates (1925) 439; see also Temporary Slavery
Commission’s Second Session Minutes, (1925) para 55 <http://biblioarchive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilMSD/C-426-M-157-1925-VI_EN.pdf> accessed 4 April 2018 (hereafter
Temporary Slavery Commission Second Session Minutes). Among the concerns Viscount Cecil
addressed in the Report was the sale of children and servants in Hedjaz. The following passage illustrates
the situation:
The Temporary Slavery Commission is informed on authority which it regards as entirely
trustworthy that many of the slaves of foreign origin in the Hedjaz are either young girls from the
Far East who come as pilgrims or are smuggled for sale; or are persons coming from various
countries accompanying their parents or masters in the pilgrimage to Mecca. The former case
would seem to merit the attention of the Commissions concerned with the traffic in women, but
there appears to be no doubt that they are sold as slaves. It is understood that certain Governments
in the Far East insist that all persons, before sailing for the Hedjaz, shall provide themselves with
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The following year, Cecil similarly hinged slavery’s definition on the elements
now expressed in Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention. He recognized that “slavery
in all its forms” required the demonstration of exercising any power attached to the right
of ownership over an individual, 59 even in cases that did not require legal ownership.
Conversely, when the conditions did not evidence the exercise of powers attaching to the
right of ownership, then such acts would not constitute slavery.60 Cecil’s report proffered
that “[a] legislative text which, as far as practicable, covers all offences against the liberty
of the individual by a single, comprehensive sentence seems preferable to one attempting
to enumerate all possible forms of slavery.”61 The Temporary Slavery Commission’s 1925
Report stated:
In order to eradicate practices restrictive of liberty so far as they may occur in connection
with marriage, concubinage, and adoption, the first object should be to strengthen the law
so as to enable the courts to repress all abuses, and, secondly and more especially, to take
measures in order that everyone should be fully aware that the status of slavery is in no
way recognised [sic] by law.62

The Commission’s intent was to outlaw any manifestation of powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person, crafting the definition in such a way that any exercise
of powers of ownership would comply with the general, inclusive definition of slavery63
and contemplating future novel ways in which slavery might manifest. Accordingly,
sexual acts that domestic slaves were constrained to perform owing to their enslaved status
would come within the definition. The drafters’ key concept was to condemn the exercise

passports. It seems desirable that this procedure should be more generally adopted. As regards the
second case, it also seems desirable that some restriction should be placed on the taking of children
or young persons to the Hedjaz and that all persons travelling as servants of or as attendants on
pilgrims should be given freedom papers and registered at the port of embarkation.

Ibid, 38–39
Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report (n 53) 1–2
60
Allain, The Law and Slavery 423–24 (n 57)
61
Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report (n 53) para 25
62
The Second Session meeting minutes of the Temporary Slavery Commission in 1925 describe that
“concubinage” fits squarely within the intended meaning of slavery as it is distinguished from wives.
Children are born to a master who are not free and thus the freeing of two people, the woman and the
child, is of issue. This was stated within a discussion of outlawing sexual slavery. Also, Sir F. Lugard
added that, with regard to concubines, those who bore children to their masters were set free and were
considered to be free born. Children of concubines shared inheritance with the children of free-born
wives. The result of freeing the concubines was that the children would become bastards and lose their
inheritance and the women would degenerate into the position of “kept women.” The Legal Adviser to
the Sudanese Government vouched for this statement of Koranic law. Temporary Slavery Commission
Second Session Minutes (n 58) para 62
63
Allain, The Law and Slavery (n 57) 423–24. Neither the Commission nor subsequently the drafters of the
1926 Slavery Convention, however, intended to outlaw what was forced labor; drafters found that,
although evidence of constrained conditions existed, no powers of de jure or de facto ownership were
exercised over persons. Jean Allain, ‘The Definition of “Slavery” in General International Law and the
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of powers attaching to the right of ownership, regardless of the acts that masters forced
slaves to perform.
Prompted by the 1925 Temporary Slavery Commission Report, the ensuing
modification to the 1926 Slavery Convention draft is singularly significant. The 1926
Slavery Convention omitted language of the types of slavery, such as “domestic slavery
and similar conditions,” from the text.64 Unsurprisingly, the drafters deemed it too limiting
to qualify specific forms of slavery, preferring to emphasize the abolition of slavery in all
its forms.65 This revision is consistent with the drafters’ intent to eradicate any and all
slavery falling under the article 1(a) definition.66
The next question is this: How did the legal understanding of the 1926 Slavery
Convention encompass the factual exercise of powers of ownership based upon sexual
access to an enslaved person—what today is referred to as “sexual slavery”? Part IV below
advances, as pleaded by amici in the Habré case, the basis for sexual slavery as indicia of
slavery, irrespective of its forms and, therefore, also as an atrocity crime under customary
international law.
IV. “Sexual Slavery” as Slavery under Customary International Law
Recent international criminal law instruments have codified “sexual slavery” as a
stand-alone crime, partially due to the failures of adequate acknowledgement,
investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and redress for victims and partially due to a
misconception of slavery. Wartime female slavery, which often includes sexual
enslavement, has received pithy legal attention, even with the increased focus on conflictrelated sexual and gender-based violence. Wartime male sexual slavery remains almost
completely unaddressed. The Tokyo Tribunal’s failure to prosecute perpetrators for the
enslavement of tens of thousands of “Comfort Women” constitutes a lamentable omission
in annals of international law’s ability to redress mass atrocity crimes. 67 Even today,
criminal conduct referred to as “sexual slavery” struggles against invisibility and impunity.
The need to re-qualify the initial charges in the Habré case starkly illustrates this problem.
Assaults on sexual integrity often have been an integral aspect of the crime of
slavery.68 United Nations Special Rapporteur Gay McDougall has found that the “term
64
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‘sexual’ is [ . . . ] an adjective to describe a form of slavery, not to denote a separate crime.
In all respects and in all circumstances, sexual slavery is slavery.”69 Notably, neither the
1926 Slavery Convention nor the 1956 Supplemental Convention specifies that slavery be
restricted to a certain sex or gender, nor does it proscribe a particular purpose for which a
person is enslaved.70 Any person, regardless of sex, age, or other status, can be enslaved.
A slave is enslaved irrespective of labor, work, or service exerted from them, meaning that
a person can be enslaved and not be required to perform any toil. Slavery is the status or
condition to which a person is reduced.
Under international law, the predominant concept of slavery emerged as a result of
the trans-Atlantic and East African Slave Trades. Slavery was characterized as an
institution based upon chattel. Chattel slavery was de jure slavery that recognized the legal
title or ownership of persons. Chattel slavery inherently included all forms of proprietary
rights over a slave’s body.71 Ownership over slaves extended to whatever labor or service
that masters forced slaves to render; thus, slave ownership included complete sexual and
reproductive proprietorship.72
Sexual access and reproductive control may be the indicia of the slavery in
question. Although much historical research remains ongoing, the practice of chattel
slavery in North and South America and the Caribbean from the 17th to the 19th Centuries
was rife with disregard for the sexual integrity of female and male slaves alike.73 Slave
auctions, for example, would advertise and sell both female and male slaves referred to as
“breeders” based on their perceived or real abilities to reproduce and bear children who
would be born into slavery. 74 Slaveholders bred child-slaves through their sexual
ownership over female and male slaves.75 Breeding slaves allowed for masters to increase
their wealth and slave labor force.
In addition to breeding, slaveholders themselves impregnated, raped, sexually
mutilated, ordered the sexual assaults of slaves, conducted sexual medical experiments on
population that was overwhelmingly female); Orlando Paterson, ‘Trafficking, Gender and Slavery: Past
and Present, in Jean Allain (ed), The Legal Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the
Contemporary (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2012)
69
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slaves, or otherwise abused them sexually. 76 Slave brothels or the housing of “fancy
[slave] girls” existed for owners’ and associates’ sexual entertainment.77 State laws that
prohibited the legal recognition of rape for female slaves reinforced sexual ownership.78
Whether evidenced by breeding, impregnation, rapes, selling of sexual access,
impregnations, sexual mutilation, or other violations of sexual integrity, 79 exercising
powers over the reproduction and sexual integrity of slaves was inherent to chattel (de
jure) slavery.
Sexual access through—and rules for access to—“sexual wives,” such as in
Zanzibar, the East African Slave Trade, or Arab slavery, provide further examples of
sexualized violence as inherent in other, Eastern institutions of slavery. 80 Today, the
Islamic State (“IS”) has even revived the past practice of legal enslavement of women and
girls, which includes sexual access under specific conditions as part of the group’s
assertion of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.81 According to IS publications, fighters have
captured, sorted, sold or gifted Yazidi women and children as “spoils of war” or sabaya.82
The IS Committee for the Buying and Selling of Slaves has organized the Yazidi slave
markets and allowed a local committee and commander to preregister IS fighters before
placing their bids to purchase slaves.83 Enforced rules on reselling Yazidi women or girls
as slaves prohibit slave trading between brothers and require that slaves complete a
menstrual cycle to demonstrate they are not pregnant prior to sale.84 Such regulations
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delimiting sexual access to a slave and controlling a slave’s reproduction demonstrate
sexualized violence as integral to and permissive as part of enslavement.
Indeed, sexual slavery––or, more precisely, sexual violence and attacks on sexual
integrity––have been understood under customary international law to fall squarely within
the actus reus—the exercise of any or all powers attaching to the right of ownership—of
slavery as an atrocity crime well before its enumeration in the Rome Statute. The outlawing
of slavery in Zanzibar, and the delayed outlawing of slaves who were “sexual wives,” or
concubines,85 for example, illustrates that sexual violence always has been a part of the
actus reus of slavery under the 1926 Slavery Convention definition.
Take the Temporary Slavery Commission’s 1925 Report, for instance, in which
experts found that, “[a]ccording to the Koranic law, if strictly observed, a free woman
cannot be a concubine . . . . The abolition of the legal status of slavery gives to the
concubine the right to claim her freedom.”86 Finally, under the institution and practice of
slavery, a master had unfettered sexual access to a slave whether or not such power was
exercised.87 Indeed, for female slaves or their children to become kin in many kinshipbased societies would have been unfathomable due to the nature of some strict hereditary
kingdoms.88 Sexual access, therefore, was an absolute right as an exercise of power of
ownership.
In 1950, the UN Secretary-General appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery to
suggest ways of eradicating slavery. 89 In its second Report in 1951, the Committee
recommended adopting a supplementary convention to the 1926 Slavery Convention that
would be “more precise than that instrument in defining the exact forms of servitude dealt
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with [in the 1926 Slavery Convention].”90 Resisting this recommendation, the SecretaryGeneral reiterated the inclusive purpose of general language in the 1926 Convention,
quoting again the Cecil Report, that the 1926 Convention “applies not only to domestic
slavery but to all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery Commission . . .
i.e., ‘debt slavery’, the enslaving of persons disguised as the adoption of children, and the
acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, etc.” 91 That “sexual
slavery” was never mentioned as a specific addition demonstrates an understanding that
sexual and reproductive access to and use of enslaved persons was accepted as an inherent
and integral aspect of slavery—either a power attaching to the right of ownership or an
indication of enslavement.
Additional evidence of sexual slavery as an integral part of the prohibition of
slavery is the UN Secretary-General’s 1953 Memorandum, which considers the
characteristics of the powers attaching to the right of ownership in the definition of
slavery. 92 The Secretary-General included that the “master may use the individual of
servile status, and in particular his [or her] capacity to work, in an absolute manner,
without any restriction other than that which might be expressly provided by law.”93
Furthermore, Article 1 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956
Supplementary Convention) prohibits four enumerated servile statuses—debt bondage,
serfdom, forced marriage, and child exploitation—“whether or not they are covered by the
definition of slavery contained in Article 1 of the Slavery Convention.”94 Thus, the 1956
Supplementary Convention expressly finds that any of these enumerated—or any other—
statuses where the powers attached to the right of ownership are exercised is covered under
the 1926 Slavery Convention.95 The 1956 Supplementary Convention does not directly
prohibit sexual slavery because it does not need to prohibit specific indicia of or acts that
evidence slavery. The explicit mention of certain forms of slavery in the 1956
Supplementary Convention serve to increase the visibility and emphasize the enforcement
of particular persistent manifestations of slavery, but did not prohibit any new forms of
enslavement. The definition of slavery persists as hinging on the exercise of any and all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over another person.
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The ICTY’s Kunarac case exemplified a form of ownership illustrating customary
international law: the accused held sixteen victims for months in captivity and subjected
them to rape, including multiple gang rapes.96 Here, the ICTY clarified that the work or
tasks slaves are forced to perform may be factors or indicia to determine whether the crime
of enslavement occurred, but do not constitute per se the elements of the crime of
enslavement under customary international law. 97 According to the Court, factors
indicative of enslavement include inter alia control of sexuality and forced labor.98
While enumeration of sexual slavery as a separate crime does emphasize its
visibility and initiates momentum toward its eradication, this more contemporary legal
separation may hinder a fuller comprehension of slavery in all of its dimensions. Sexual
access is inherent in—or at times is the raison d’être of certain forms of—slavery.
Historically, as explained supra, the slavery endured by females and males in the New
World often enmeshed manual labor, sexual access and, reproductive control under powers
exercised by a perpetrator-slave owner.99 The specific codification today in international
criminal law tends to decouple hard manual slave labor, often misconceived of and
conflated with the term chattel slavery, from physical or psychological sexual violence
that a “manual” slave must endure. Such decoupling can be problematic in that it fails to
understand the nature of slavery in all its forms, and that sexualized violence is but one
mechanism of exercising control (i.e. powers attaching to the right of ownership) over a
person.
The desuetude of redressing slavery based upon sexual access and violence
accounts for a legally and practically misguided extraction of sexual slavery from the
crimes of slavery and enslavement. Even if pragmatically successful in combating
impunity for sexual and gender-based crimes in international criminal law in the short
term, such a divergence from customary international law must be corrected going forward
to avoid long-term fragmentation of the international law on slavery. The Rome Statute’s
confusing enumeration of both enslavement and sexual slavery as a crime against
humanity, and its omissions of enslavement under war crimes while listing sexual slavery,
are incoherent, yet not dispositive of the customary law basis of sexualized violence––
what is characterized today as “sexual slavery”––as part of the prohibition of the crime of
slavery.100
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In light of the discussion above, the recognition of sexual violence and attacks on
sexual integrity as part of the customary international law safeguard on slavery is indelible.
Given that an act of a sexual nature––what is enumerated in some international instruments
as “sexual slavery”––has been recognized as indicia of slavery and part of customary
international law since 1926, sexual slavery was an international crime under customary
international law during the time of the Habré regime.
Regrettably, the EAC overlooked an opportunity to deepen further a legal
understanding of slavery in international law. Sexual violence and attacks on sexual
integrity are essential indicia of slavery. Such a legal pronouncement would have lent itself
to combating both male and female slavery in times of armed conflict or other atrocious
political settings. Moreover, it would have assisted in increasing visibility for, among other
victims, child-slaves born enslaved as a result of sexualized slavery.
Finally, Habré’s conviction might have delivered a more refined gendered analysis
of the sexual enslavement that occurred in Chad, thus helping to clarify the crime’s place
in customary international law generally. Specifically, the Court might have examined the
gender dimensions of slavery, including what is now codified as “sexual slavery,” by
explaining the ways in which female and male slaves experience slavery. These nuanced
analyses are fundamental to rectifying discriminatory application of the law on slavery. A
lack of further exploration of sexual slavery as the actus reus or indicia of any and all
forms of slavery under customary international law, for instance, generally neglects
gendered roles of women, girl, men and boy-victims of sexualized violence and slavery.
As a legal matter, recognizing the customary international law basis of sexual slavery also
allows for the redress for men and boys—boy soldiers or “Bacha bazi” in Afghanistan, for
example—under slavery as a war crime and enslavement as a crime against humanity. In
the Habré case, this lack of gendered recognition was detrimental to the Chadian and
international communities’ understanding of the scope and scale of Habré’s ruthless reign.
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